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World life expectancy is increasing and many populations will begin to age rapidly.
The impeding prevalence of a greater number of older people living longer lives will
have significant social and economic implications. It is important to understand how
older people make economic and social decisions. Aging can be associated with a
“phenomenon of decline” and also greater wisdom. This paper seeks to examine the
relationship between wisdom and aging. It reviews and connects the behavioral sciences
and neuroscience literature on age differences in the following social and economic
decision making domains that represent subcomponents of wisdom: (1) prosocial
behavior in experimental economic games and competitive situations; (2) resolving
social conflicts; (3) emotional homeostasis; (4) self-reflection; (5) dealing effectively with
uncertainty in the domains of risk, ambiguity and intertemporal choice. Overall, we
find a lack of research into how older people make economic and social decisions.
There is, however, some evidence that older adults outperform young adults on certain
subcomponents of wisdom, but the exact relationship between old age and each
subcomponent remains unclear. A better understanding of these relationships holds the
potential to alleviate a wide range of mental health problems, and has broad implications
for social policies aimed at the elderly.
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Introduction
‘‘With age comes wisdom, but sometimes age comes alone.’’
—Oscar Wilde
World life expectancy has been steadily rising in the past two centuries and is expected to
continue increasing for the foreseeable future (Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002). Increased longevity
is especially pronounced in developed countries compared to developing ones (Mathers et al.,
2001). Based on a steady increase of almost 3 months of life per year, it may not be uncommon
for those born since 2000 in certain developed countries, such as USA, the UK, Japan and
other western European countries, to live for 100 years (Christensen et al., 2009; Vaupel, 2010).
This is astonishing given that the average life expectancy in developed countries was under
45 years in 1900 (Juvin, 2010). The population is also expected to continue to age rapidly over
the next few decades (Lutz et al., 2008). There are serious economic and social implications
of our increasing longevity and rapidly aging population (Schneider and Guralnik, 1990;
Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000; Tinker, 2002; Poterba, 2004; Bloom et al., 2010b; see Bloom et al., 2010a).
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The extra years of lives will need to be financed and there will
be less people in the labor force than outside of it based on
current retirement age laws (Sierra et al., 2009). The roles of social
norms surrounding education, employment and retirement will
need to be rethought so that the elderly can continue to
contribute without impinging on the prospects of the younger
citizens (Vaupel and Gowan, 1986; Vaupel and Loichinger,
2006).
Traditionally, research on aging has focused on the cognitive
aspects of age-related changes. Old age is associated with
declines in many aspects of cognition (reviewed in Hedden and
Gabrieli, 2004; Raz and Rodrigue, 2006; Park and Reuter-Lorenz,
2009), as well as with a variety of detrimental stereotypes of
incompetence (see Cuddy et al., 2005; Kite et al., 2005; North
and Fiske, 2012). Recent major theories on aging, however,
emphasize that emotion and motivation play a fundamental
role in shaping age related changes in decision making and
well-being. The Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen
et al., 1999) proposes that time horizons influence goals and
people engage in a lifelong selection process of strategically
and adaptively cultivating their social networks to maximize
social and emotional gains and minimize social and emotional
risks. When time is perceived as open-ended, goals are most
likely to be preparatory and to be used to optimize the future,
e.g., gathering information, experiencing novelty and expanding
breadth of knowledge. As a result, young adults may place the
greatest emphasis on the potential for information gain and
future contact. When constraints on time are perceived, goals
focus more on objectives that can be realized in their pursuit to
maximize meaningful activities in the present. As a consequence,
goals emphasize feeling states, particularly regulating emotional
states to optimize well-being. Thus, elderly people tend to
place the greatest emphasis on the potential for affective
gain. Strength and Vulnerability Integration Theory (Charles,
2010) incorporates the socioemotional selectivity theory and
further states that aging is associated with strengths in emotion
regulation that entail the use of attentional, appraisal, and
behavioral strategies of emotion, as well as vulnerabilities in
emotion regulation as a consequence of reduced physiological
flexibility, especially in situations that elicit high levels of
sustained emotional arousal. The Motivational Theory of Life-
Span Development (Heckhausen et al., 2010) proposes that
individuals in late adulthood shift from primary control
processes that are directed at changing the world by bringing
the environment in line with one’s wishes to secondary control
processes aimed at changing the self to bring oneself in line with
environmental forces. To meet the major challenges faced in old
age, individuals need to increasingly resort to secondary control
strategies of adjusting expectations, values, and attributions in
order to pursue more attainable goals when certain primary
control goals become unattainable. These theories suggest that
aging is associated with dramatic changes in personal goals and
highlight the strategies and skills used to achieve these new
goals.
While aging is generally viewed as a ‘‘phenomenon of
decline’’, there is an aspect to it that ‘‘holds more promise
than present reality may reveal’’: wisdom (Baltes and Staudinger,
1993). The concept of wisdom has its roots in religion
and philosophy (see Ardelt, 2004; Baltes and Smith, 2008).
Wisdom is a complex, multi-faceted construct and there
is no consensus on its definition, instead there are a
variety, of mostly overlapping, theories of wisdom (Baltes
and Staudinger, 2000). This has been largely encapsulated
and distilled into six subcomponents by Meeks and Jeste
(2009): (1) prosocial attitudes/behaviors; (2) social decision
making/pragmatic knowledge of life; (3) emotional homeostasis;
(4) reflection/self-understanding; (5) value relativism/tolerance;
and (6) acknowledgment of and dealing effectively with
uncertainty.
Despite empirical research into the construct of wisdom
spanning more than three decades, the topic of wisdom
continues to be overlooked by the neuroscience and psychology
communities (Jeste and Harris, 2010) and only has gained
attention in recent years in the field of aging-related research.
This paper will review and connect the behavioral sciences
and neuroscience literature on wisdom and aging, and will be
organized around the theoretical framework of Meeks and Jeste
(2009). For this review, we integrate the two subcomponents
of (2) social decision making/pragmatic knowledge of life,
i.e., knowing how to successfully navigate challenging social
situations, and (5) value relativism, i.e., tolerance of another
person’s or culture’s value systems, into one: ‘‘resolving social
conflicts’’. Our rationale is that both of these subcomponents of
wisdom are essential to making sound social decisions. We begin
with a review of the literature on age differences in prosocial
behaviors, specifically on experimental economic games.
Prosocial Behaviors
Wisdom entails the ability to achieve a common social good.
Prosocial behavior broadly refers to acting beyond one’s
self-interest to benefit other people in one’s social group
and/or society (Penner et al., 2005). In economics, there are
three major types of prosocial behavior: reciprocity, inequity
aversion and altruism (see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). They
are usually measured by the amount of a finite amount of
money that is split with another person in experimental
economic games. Reciprocity refers to responding in a similar
manner to the actions of another person. This depends on
the perception of (un)fairness of the actions of the other
person, which is determined by whether split amounts are
deemed equitable. Inequity aversion refers to wanting to
achieve an equitable split of outcomes. This includes wanting
to increase or decrease the amount allocated to another
person who falls short or exceeds the equitable threshold
respectively. Altruism refers to always, i.e., unconditionally,
responding positively to another person’s action. This
means never wanting to decrease another person’s allocated
amount.
Standard economic theory assumes that ‘‘all people are
exclusively motivated by their material self-interest’’ and thus,
do not care about the well-being of others (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). That is, players will maximize their self-
interest at the expense of others—even in experimental games.
Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2015 | Volume 7 | Article 120
Lim and Yu Aging and wisdom
However, an overwhelming number of studies have consistently
rejected this standard economic ‘‘self-interest hypothesis’’ and
have provided evidence showing that individuals also have
prosocial motivation (for reviews, see: Fehr and Schmidt,
2001; Meier, 2006; Levitt and List, 2007; Henrich et al.,
2010). There are at least five common economic games to
measure prosocial behavior: ultimatum, dictator, trust, prisoner’s
dilemma and public goods. These experimental games are
traditionally played under complete anonymity (to the other
player and the experimenter). Depending on the type of
prosocial behavior of interest, these games may be played
either one-shot, i.e., once, or repeated. These games differ
in whether they are played simultaneously, i.e., players make
their moves at the same time, or sequentially, i.e., players
move one at a time and the move of a preceding player
is known. In the next section, we will review older people’s
prosocial behavior on these games. Although there are numerous
studies examining prosocial behavior on these games, only
a handful have examined its relationship with old age. We
will begin with a review of ultimatum game (UG)s (see
Figure 1A).
Ultimatum Game
The classic UG is a two-player, sequential game that involves
splitting a sum of money between a Proposer and a Responder
(Güth et al., 1982). The Proposer is endowed with a fixed amount
of money, say, $10, and has to propose some amount, x, to
another person, whose identity is not known. The Responder has
two choices: accept or reject the proposed offer. If the offer is
accepted, the Responder gets x, while the Proposer gets $10-x;
if the offer is rejected, both players receive nothing (See Thaler,
1988, for a readable description of the common UG variations).
The standard economic ‘‘self-interest hypothesis’’ predicts that
the Proposer will offer the minimum amount possible (e.g., one
cent), which would be accepted by the Responder who values
this over nothing. However, this is very rarely the case (see Güth
and Tietz, 1990; Güth, 1995; Cooper and Dutcher, 2011; Güth
and Kocher, 2014). A meta-analysis of 37 papers found that, on
average, Proposers offered 40% of their ‘‘pie’’, i.e., endowment,
to Responders (Oosterbeek et al., 2004). Offers for larger pie
sizes and shares tend to be rejected less often (Oosterbeek et al.,
2004); many studies report that it is not uncommon for offers
of less than 40–50% of the pie to be rejected (see Cooper
and Dutcher, 2011). This willingness to punish unfair behavior
while incurring a cost reflects the degree of social inequity
aversion.
We report a total of five studies that examine the prosocial
behavior of older people on UGs. Two studies examined age
differences for Proposers and reported different results. One
study found that older participants proposed more generous
offers than younger participants in the standard UG (Bailey
et al., 2013), while another found no age differences (Beadle
et al., 2012). Studies examined age differences for Responders’
acceptance/rejection rates with mixed results. Two studies
did not find any age differences (Beadle et al., 2012; Bailey
et al., 2013). One study reported no difference for fair (50%
of the pie) and unfair (10% and 20% of the pie) offers
but older participants were more likely to reject moderately
unfair (30% of the pie) offers (Harlé and Sanfey, 2012).
It was found that older participants rejected more unfair
offers (Roalf et al., 2012). When the unfairness was self-
advantageous, older participants were more likely to reject very
high offers, which suggests inequity aversion since they do
not want to be unfair to the other party (Bellemare et al.,
2011).
Overall, older participants exhibit at least equal, or perhaps
even more, prosocial behavior as Proposers. As Responders,
older people appear to display greater inequity aversion, even in
self-advantageous conditions.
Dictator Game
The classic dictator game (DG; see Figure 1B) is similar
to the UG, except that the Responder cannot reject, and
must accept, the amount offered by the Proposer, i.e., the
‘‘dictator’’ (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994). The
standard economic ‘‘self-interest hypothesis’’ predicts that the
Proposer will offer nothing. However, a meta-analysis of 129
experiments reported that 63.89% of participants offered a
positive amount with an average of 42.64% of the pie, while
36.11% offered nothing (Engel, 2011). Further, age had ‘‘a
strong effect’’: giving nothing decreased with age and ‘‘never
happens in the elderly’’, who give at least 50% of the pie
almost all of the time (Engel, 2011). It is also worth reporting
the results of three other studies that specifically examined
the relationship between prosocial behavior on DG and older
people. These studies were published after the meta-analysis.
Two studies did not find any significant relationship (Roalf
et al., 2012; Rieger and Mata, 2015). The other study used
a modified DG by inducing empathy into dictators and
found older people to give significantly more (Beadle et al.,
2013).
Overall, older people seem to exhibit more prosocial behavior
in the DG. It is worth highlighting a surprising finding from
the meta-analysis: the mode for elderly contribution was 100%
of the pie (Engel, 2011). However, more studies are needed to
investigate age differences in the DG since 94.7% of dictators
in the meta-analysis were students and only 0.7% was elderly
people.
Trust Game
The classic trust game (TG; see Figure 1C) is a two-player,
sequential game that involves splitting a sum of endowed
money between an Investor and Trustee in two stages (Berg
et al., 1995). In the first stage, both players are endowed with
a fixed amount of money, say, $10, which the Investor can
choose to invest or keep. If the Investor chooses to keep the
money, the game ends. If the Investor chooses to invest, then
an amount, x, must be specified. This amount, x, is then
tripled by the experimenter so that the Trustee receives 3x
In the second stage, the Trustee can decide whether to return
the money to the Investor. If the Trustee decides to keep the
money then the game ends with the Investor having a total
of $10−x and the Trustee, $10 + 3x If the Trustee chooses to
return some money, y, then the game ends with the Trustee
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FIGURE 1 | The behavioral game paradigms. In sequential games,
such as the ultimatum game (UG) (A), dictator game (B), and trust game
(C), games are played sequentially, i.e., players move one at a time and
the move of a preceding player is known. In simultaneous games, such
as prisoner’s game (D), and public goods game (E), players make their
moves at the same time.
earning a total of $10 + 3x −y and the Investor, $10−x+y.
However, in many replications of game, the Trustee is not
endowed with any money at the beginning (Johnson and Mislin,
2011).
The TG can be viewed as a variant of the DG, where the
Trustee dictates an amount that was initially allocated by the
Investor (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). The standard economic ‘‘self-
interest hypothesis’’ predicts that no money will be invested
since the Investor will anticipate the Trustee keeping all of
the investment and not returning anything. This hypothesis is,
however, not supported by empirical findings. A meta-analysis
of 162 experiments involving more than 23,000 participants
found Investors to invest 50% of the endowment on average, and
Trustees to return 37% of the total amount they had available
(Johnson and Mislin, 2011).
Individual studies examining the relationship of older
people’s prosocial behavior on TGs report mixed results. Three
studies found no significant relationship for amount invested
and amount returned by Trustees (Etang et al., 2011; Johansson-
Stenman et al., 2013; Rieger and Mata, 2015). One study found
older people to invest and return more (Sutter and Kocher,
2007). Three studies found older people to invest less, of which
two found older people to return more (Fehr et al., 2003;
Bellemare and Kröger, 2007), while the other did not measure
this relationship (Holm and Nystedt, 2005). The meta-analysis
did not examine age but found students to return less money
compared to non-students and no difference for amount invested
(Johnson and Mislin, 2011), which could suggest that older
people invest more since non-students are generally older than
students.
Overall, there is no clear evidence on the prosocial behavior
of older people playing TGs based on the seven studies reviewed.
Of the seven studies that examined Investor behavior, three
found no significant relationship with age, three found a negative
relationship and one found a positive relationship. Six of the
seven studies examined Trustee behavior and half found no
significant relationship with age while the other half found a
positive relationship.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
The classic prisoner’s dilemma (PD; see Figure 1D) is a two-
player, simultaneous gamewhere each player can either choose to
cooperate or defect. Howmuch each player earns depends jointly
on the choices made by both players. There are three possible
scenarios with their respective payoffs in parentheses, where a
larger number represents a higher payoff: one player cooperates
while the other defects (1:4), both players cooperate (3:3), and
both players defect (2:2).
The PD tests whether players reciprocate expected
cooperation (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). The standard economic
‘‘self-interest hypothesis’’ predicts that each player will choose
to defect, which would lead to both players earning the second
lowest payoff. Although mutual cooperation would lead to the
second best outcome, there is the possibility of earning the worst
payoff if the other player defects. This is also known as the Nash
equilibrium: both players can do no better in terms of payoffs
than to defect (Nash, 1951). However, there is overwhelming
evidence of cooperation in experimental PD games (Dawes,
1980; Sally, 1995; Cooper et al., 1996; Brosig, 2002; Jones, 2008;
Balliet, 2009).
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Although the PD is one of the most well-known games, there
are no studies examining the performance of older people. We
identified 124 unique PD studies from four meta-analysis studies
(Balliet, 2009; Balliet et al., 2009, 2011a,b). Of the 119 studies
that we could access, 108 used student samples (90.7%). The
remaining 11 studies either did not report age, or had a mean
age of <37 years old. More studies involving older participants
are required for a better understanding of their performance
on PD.
Public Goods Game
The classic public goods game (PGG; see Figure 1E) is a
generalized form of PD involving multiple players. Players are
endowed with some amount of money, which they can choose
whether to contribute to a ‘‘public good’’ or not. If players
contribute (cooperate), the sum of contributions are multiplied
by some factor,m, and distributed evenly to all players, including
those who did not contribute. If players do not contribute
(defect), they keep their money and stand to gain from the
distribution based on the contribution of other players.
While the group would benefit most if everyone contributed,
the standard economic ‘‘self-interest’’ hypothesis predicts no
contribution at all. This hypothesis, is however, not supported
by empirical findings (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). A
meta-analysis of 27 studies involving 711 groups of participants
found the average contribution to be 37.7% of the total
endowment (Zelmer, 2003). Only one study examined the
relationship between older people’s prosocial behavior in a
PGG and it reported a concave result, i.e., the middle-
aged participants contributed the most compared to older
and younger participants (Rieger and Mata, 2015). More
studies involving older participants are required for a better
understanding of their performance on PGG.
Competitive Behavior
The willingness and ability to compete is usually important for
the economy. It has been suggested that prosocial tendencies
increase while competitive behavior declines with older age
(see Mayr et al., 2012). There are three behavioral experiments
that examine competitive behavior in old age (Charness and
Villeval, 2009; Mayr et al., 2012; Sproten and Schwieren,
2015). In these experiments, participants are given a task, e.g.,
simple mental arithmetic, and the choice of payment based on
absolute or relative performance. Choosing to be paid based on
performance relative to other participants and doing well reflects
a willingness and ability to compete respectively. Two of the
three studies found no significant age differences in willingness
to compete (Charness and Villeval, 2009; Sproten and Schwieren,
2015), while the other found an inverted U-shaped relationship:
willingness increased up to 50 years old and declined after Mayr
et al. (2012). All three studies report no significant age differences
in ability to compete. Taken together, these findings mostly
suggest that older people remain willing and able to compete.
Summary
We surveyed the literature on the prosocial behavior of elderly
people across five common types of experimental games. Results
were mixed and there was no clear evidence of age differences
in prosocial behavior across these games. We also identified
several important issues consistent across games that need to
be addressed in the future. First, there are only a few studies
involving older participants. For some games such as PD, there
were no studies examining age differences. Second, most of
these studies involve small samples, e.g., 18 young adults vs. 20
older adults (Harlé and Sanfey, 2012). Third, there were many
sources of heterogeneity across studies. There were differences in
whether studies employed a between- or within-subjects design
and controlled for confounding factors such as income, as well
as the average age of participants and in the design of the
games, e.g., one-shot vs. repeated, amount endowed, etc. We also
surveyed the literature examining the competitive behavior of
older people in experiments where participants can choose to be
paid based on absolute or relative performance. Overall results
from three studies suggest that older people generally remain
willing and able to compete.
Resolving Social Conflicts
The ability to resolve social conflicts can be viewed as possessing
social wisdom and refers to recognizing and respecting
differences in individuals’ value systems and employing
pragmatic reasoning to successfully navigate social issues in life
with a preference for compromise (Basseches, 1980; Kramer,
1990; Baltes and Smith, 2008). There is empirical evidence
that social wisdom improves with age. Older people tend to
use more complex reasoning schemas that emphasize multiple
perspectives and compromise when faced with various social
dilemma scenarios (Grossmann et al., 2010). However, gains in
social wisdom may be influenced by cultural differences in the
socialization of interpersonal harmony and conflict avoidance.
For example, there were age differences in social wisdom between
Japanese and American adults, but this depended on whether
the dilemma was interpersonal or intergroup (Grossmann et al.,
2012). Further, contrary to the adage ‘‘with age comes wisdom,
a recent study found no age differences in wise reasoning about
personal conflicts in American adults (Grossmann and Kross,
2014). Moreover, both younger and older adults exhibited
similar amounts of the self-distancing effect, i.e., reasoning more
wisely about other people’s social problems than about their
own. The lack of age-related difference in wise reasoning was
also observed in another study, which asked participants about
nonthreatening, but still rather age-neutral area of the self, e.g.,
‘‘Please think aloud about yourself as a friend’’ (Mickler and
Staudinger, 2008). These findings suggest that social wisdom
may not be a universal and homogenous construct, and highlight
the need for more studies on samples from different countries
and cultures.
Everyday problem-solving/decision-making effectiveness
(EPSE) is another domain that involves resolving social conflicts.
EPSE incorporates both real world decisionmaking and everyday
problem solving abilities (see Thornton and Dumke, 2005). EPSE
tasks typically assess the number of ‘‘safe and effective’’ solutions
participants can generate to everyday social problems, e.g.,
‘‘What should an elderly woman who has no other source
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of income do if her social security check does not come in 1
month?’’ (Heidrich and Denney, 1994). A higher number of
solutions generated reflects greater EPSE. A meta-analysis of 28
studies (N = 4482) found an overall decline in EPSE among older
participants (Thornton and Dumke, 2005). Moderator analyses
revealed that age differences in EPSE were substantially reduced
when problems were interpersonal and when older adults were
highly educated (Thornton and Dumke, 2005). We also found
that most, if not all, of the 28 studies were conducted in Anglo
countries.
Emotional Homeostasis
Successful emotion regulation that maintains emotional
homeostasis is crucial to wisdom. Old age is generally perceived
as ‘‘Doom and gloom’’, which characterizes later life as a
time of profound physical, cognitive, and emotional declines.
Yet recent empirical and theoretical work challenges this
view by illustrating the ‘‘bright side’’ of aging. Accumulating
evidence shows that older adults attend to and remember
positive vs. negative information to a greater extent than
younger adults (Mather and Carstensen, 2005). A recent
meta-analysis of age-related positivity effect confirmed that
older adults show a significant information processing bias
toward positive, but not negative, information (Reed et al.,
2014). In corroborating with these behavioral evidence,
recent neuroimaging studies found a relative reduction in
activation during loss anticipation paralleled by significantly
weaker negative arousal for large loss cues in older adults,
despite intact striatal and insular activation during gain
anticipation with age (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). Healthy
older adults also exhibited enhanced activity in the nucleus
accumbens in response to an expected reward value (Chowdhury
et al., 2013). A recent neuroimaging study demonstrated that
responsiveness to regret was specifically reduced in successful
aging paralleled by autonomic and frontostriatal characteristics
indicating adaptive shifts in emotion regulation, suggesting
that disengagement from regret reflects a critical resilience
factor for emotional health in older age (Brassen et al., 2012).
Taken together, recent research indicates that older adults
may outperform younger adults in maintaining emotional
homeostasis, which might contribute to their wisdom in dealing
with life challenges.
Self-Reflection
The concept of self is very complex and includes various
types of self-directed internal thought processes including
autobiographical reminiscence, self-referencing, self-esteem, and
so on. The ability to reflect on self is an essential prerequisite
for insight. To date, the vast majority of studies examining
age-related changes in self-understanding have focused on self-
referential processes. Self-referential processing takes place when
an individual encodes information into memory in reference to
the self (Rogers et al., 1977; Symons and Johnson, 1997). Recent
behavioral studies found that self- and close other-referencing
similarly enhance memory for both young and older adults
relative to the distant other people condition, suggesting that
self-referencing provides an age-equivalent boost in memory
(Hamami et al., 2011). Other studies found that elderly subjects
were lower on self-consciousness and their pattern of recall
was similar for self- vs. other-referenced items. Neuroimaging
studies have demonstrated that the default network regions such
as medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate gyrus are
implicated in the processing of self-relevant social information
(Gusnard et al., 2001; Martinelli et al., 2013). The default network
is engaged during baseline rest periods when participants are
not focused on task-directed thought and is suppressed during
attention-demanding tasks (Raichle et al., 2001). Aging also
alters the neural activity associated with the successful formation
of memories for self-referenced information (Gutchess et al.,
2010). Future studies need to directly link changes in self-
understanding and performance in social problem solving and
personal well-being.
Dealing Effectively with Uncertainty
Decisions often need to be made in situations of risk
and ambiguity, i.e., uncertainty. Dealing with such situations
effectively is a crucial component of wisdom. In decision
theory, a distinction is made between risk and ambiguity based
on whether the probability associated with an outcome is
known. If the objective probability of an outcome is known,
it is risky; if the objective probability of an outcome is not
known, it is ambiguous (Tversky and Fox, 1995). The two
classic economic theories for understanding decisions under
risk and ambiguity are expected utility (EU) and subjective
expected utility (SEU). In EU (Morgenstern and Von Neumann,
1947), outcomes are evaluated based on their objective
probabilities. In SEU (Savage, 1954), objective probabilities
may not be known and outcomes are evaluated based on
the decision maker’s subjective probabilities of outcomes. In
both theories, decision makers multiply the probabilities and
values associated with outcomes and choose the outcome
that yields the greatest expected value. Attitudes towards
risk and ambiguity are generally classified as ‘‘aversion’’ or
‘‘seeking’’. Risk aversion is defined as preferring a less risky
outcome to a more risky outcome with equal or greater
expected value (Rabin and Thaler, 2001), e.g., choosing between
$10 for sure and a 50% chance to win $20 or nothing.
Conversely, risk seeking is defined as preferring a more
risky outcome to a less risky outcome with equal or greater
expected value. Ambiguity aversion is defined as preferring
outcomes with known probabilities to outcomes with unknown
probabilities; conversely, ambiguity seeking is defined preferring
outcomes with unknown probabilities to outcomes with known
probabilities (Epstein, 1999).
Risk
Risky choices are usually elicited in laboratory experimental
settings using a variety of behavioral tasks. These tasks can be
classified as requiring decision makers to make their decisions
from description or experience (Hertwig et al., 2004). In tasks
requiring decisions from description, options are described with
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their outcomes and probabilities. In tasks requiring decisions
from experience, these descriptions are not explicitly provided
and decision makers instead rely on personal experience from
making previous similar choices.
An example of a task requiring decisions from description
would be choosing between $10 for sure and a 50% chance to
win $20 or nothing. A large number of studies investigating
risk employ this approach (Weber et al., 2004). However,
this approach has been criticized on the grounds of being an
unrealistic representation of typical real world situations where
summary descriptions of choice outcomes and probabilities are
not provided (Hertwig et al., 2004). Instead, it was argued,
tasks requiring decisions from experience are more reflective
of everyday life (Hertwig et al., 2004). An example of such a
task would be repeatedly choosing between outcomes sampled
from unknown probability distributions and this is usually
done on a computer. It is worth noting that decisions from
experience contain a degree of uncertainty, i.e., it is not strictly
uncertain because the statistical probability can be estimated
(see Rakow and Newell, 2010). Intuitively, one would expect
choices to be similar on both tasks when payments are the
same on average. However, this is not the case: on a decision
from description task, the modal choice tends to be the risky
option while the sure outcome tends to be preferred on a
decision from experience task (see Hau et al., 2008; Rakow
and Newell, 2010). This difference in risky choice is known
as the description-experience gap. Several explanations for this
gap have been proposed (for a review, see Hertwig and Erev,
2009).
A meta-analysis of 29 studies (N = 4093) using various
behavioral tasks to investigate age differences in risky decision
making reported mixed results (Mata et al., 2011). There
was no overall significant age difference in tasks involving
decisions from description although age differences varied across
individual tasks. On tasks involving decisions from experience,
there was a significant overall age difference: older adults were
slightly more risk seeking (d = 0.28). However, age differences
varied across individual tasks. Combining tasks involving both
decisions from experience and description yielded a negligible
age difference (d = 0.07). The authors conclude that ‘‘different
tasks characteristics engender age-related differences in risky
choice’’ (Mata et al., 2011).
Ambiguity
An ambiguity-averse individual would rather choose an
alternative where the probability distribution of the outcomes is
known over one where the probabilities are unknown. Regarding
uncertain outcomes, people are generally believed to display
ambiguity aversion (Camerer and Weber, 1992; Keren and
Gerritsen, 1999). However, there is a dearth of studies examining
age differences in decision making in ambiguous situations.
One study found no significant age differences in gambles
(Kovalchik et al., 2005), while another found older participants
to be less ambiguity-averse in gambles (Sproten et al., 2010)
i.e., they were more likely to choose the ambiguous outcome
to the certain outcome. The lack of studies could be due to the
general difficulty in measuring pure ambiguity in laboratory
experiments (Lopes, 1983). As such, more studies investigating
how older people make ambiguous choices are needed.
Intertemporal Choice
Wisdom is required to make good decisions about future life
plans and goals (Baltes and Smith, 2008). Many important life
decisions require making intertemporal choices, i.e., trading
off time and outcomes such as money, health or happiness.
For example, deciding whether to pursue higher education
while earning little to no money over a few years for
a potentially greater lifetime earnings in the future (Read
et al., 2013). Intertemporal choices involve ambiguity since the
future is uncertain (Read and Read, 2004). In experiments,
participants are typically asked to choose between smaller-
sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) amounts of money, e.g., $100
today or $110 in 1 year. Standard economic theory assumes
exponential, i.e., constant per period, discounting, although
this is not supported by empirical evidence, which suggests
that individuals tend to be impatient, i.e., they prefer SS
outcomes, and discount future outcomes more (Frederick et al.,
2002).
Fourteen studies examined the relationship between
impatience and age.1 Half studies found older people to be
more patient (Green et al., 1994; Harrison et al., 2002; Reimers
et al., 2009; Whelan and Mchugh, 2010; Löckenhoff et al., 2011;
Halfmann et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013). Four studies found no
difference (Chao et al., 2009; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011; Roalf
et al., 2012; Rieger and Mata, 2015). Two studies found older
people to be more impatient (Green et al., 1996; Albert and
Duffy, 2012).2 Finally one study found a curvilinear relationship
with middle-aged people the most patient, while older people
were more impatient than younger people (Read and Read,
2004). The only two studies that investigated intertemporal
discounting on losses both found no age effects (Löckenhoff
et al., 2011; Halfmann et al., 2013).
There are several possible explanations for the discrepancies
in results across studies. For example, Read and Read (2004)
pointed out that an earlier study by Green et al. (1994) focussed
on incomparable samples, which were quite small (n = 12
per group), without controlling for confounding factors such
as income, etc. Similar criticisms may apply to more recent
studies as well (e.g., Whelan and Mchugh, 2010; Samanez-Larkin
et al., 2011; Halfmann et al., 2013). Rieger and Mata (2015)
proposed another reason for their finding of no age effects in 700
Moroccans: age differences may not generalize across cultures
and nationalities. Another reason pointed out by Li et al. (2013)
is the difference in the average age of older participants across
studies, with few studies having sufficient data for participants
above 65 years old.
Finally, we noticed large differences in the questions asked
across studies. For example, monetary amounts offered ranged
1Studies either measure the discount rate or impatience but holding the
amounts and time constant, a higher discount rate implies greater impatience.
2To be precise, Green et al. (1996) found lower income adults more impatient
than upper income younger adults but no differences between upper income
younger and older adults.
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from less than $10 to $1800 and the interval length between
SS and LL varied from a few days to weeks, months and
even years. Studies have found impatience to be influenced
by the magnitude of the outcome, the interval length between
outcomes and the delay from the present to the availability
of the outcomes (e.g., Thaler, 1981; Kirby et al., 1999;
Read, 2001; Read and Roelofsma, 2003). These factors may
influence people of different ages differently, although no
studies have examined this yet. There were also few studies
investigating age differences and intertemporal choices involving
losses.
Summary
Taken together, these studies revealed that age-related changes in
economic decisions involving risk, ambiguity, and intertemporal
choices are determined by task characteristics, the specific age
range, and a variety of other methodological factors (Frederick
et al., 2002; Mata et al., 2011). There is insufficient evidence
to accurately determine whether older adults make risky,
ambiguous and intertemporal choices differently from younger
adults.
Concluding Remarks
Overall, the relationships between age and each of the
subcomponents of wisdom remain unclear. This is a relatively
young field, and it is still a challenging prospect to integrate
the conflicting findings often found in this field. Several
issues may contribute to the inconsistency in findings. First,
there were differences in the average age across studies,
with few studies having sufficient data for participants above
65 years old. For studies that used a between-subjects
design, the average age for both the older and younger, i.e.,
comparison, group of participants could differ substantially
across studies. Second, there were significant methodological
variations across studies. Studies differed in the types of task
used, study designs employed and in controlling for potential
confounding factors. Third, a number of studies, especially in
the neurosciences, used small sample sizes, which undermines
the reliability of the findings due to a lack of statistical power
(Button et al., 2013). These issues have been consistently
documented in the aging literature (Rhodes, 1983; Kite and
Johnson, 1988; Thornton and Dumke, 2005; Ng and Feldman,
2008).
We also uncovered several gaps in the literature that
future research can address. First, participants in most of the
studies were mainly from Anglo countries. This is consistent
with findings from Henrich et al. (2010) who questioned
generalizability of behavioral science findings across human
populations due to the overwhelming number of studies on
student samples from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich
and Democratic countries, and in particular USA. The need
for non-Anglo samples is relevant given the finding of age-
related differences in social wisdom between Japanese and
American adults (Grossmann et al., 2012). Second, there is a
lack of research into how factors such as gender, individual
differences in personality, culture and the environment influence
wisdom in the elderly. Third, studies typically employed cross-
sectional and not longitudinal designs, which is in line with
other fields examining age differences (Rhodes, 1983; Ng and
Feldman, 2008). This results in cohort effects (Rhodes, 1983),
which threaten the internal validity of studies and limit our
understanding of age-related changes in the subcomponents of
wisdom over the lifetime.
There is a compelling need for future studies to address the
aforementioned issues in order to better understand how older
people make economic and social decisions. This is especially
important given the impending demographic shift to an older
society. The prejudice and stereotypes may limit meaningful
participation in society, e.g., jobs, and affect the mental health
states of old people, who may even internalize and play into
the stereotypes in self-fulfilling prophecies (Taylor and Walker,
1994, 1998; Levy, 2001; Coudin and Alexopoulos, 2010). A better
understanding of the actual changes in old age can help foster
a more inclusive society that taps on the expertise and skills of
those older. This in turn may help alleviate feelings of social
isolation, loneliness and depression (Perlman and Peplau, 1981).
Understanding these issues is pertinent to implementing early
interventions aimed at preventing a wide range of mental health
problems, and has broad implications for social policies aimed at
the elderly.
References
Albert, S. M., and Duffy, J. (2012). Differences in risk aversion between
young and older adults. Neurosci. Neuroecon. 2012, 3–9. doi: 10.2147/
nan.s27184
Ardelt, M. (2004). Wisdom as expert knowledge system: a critical review of
a contemporary operationalization of an ancient concept. Hum. Dev. 47,
257–285. doi: 10.1159/000079154
Bailey, P. E., Ruffman, T., and Rendell, P. G. (2013). Age-related differences in
social economic decision making: the ultimatum game. J. Gerontol. B Psychol.
Sci. Soc. Sci. 68, 356–363. doi: 10.1093/geronb/gbs073
Balliet, D. (2009). Communication and cooperation in social dilemmas: a
meta-analytic review. J. Conflict Resolut. 54, 39–57. doi: 10.1177/0022002709
352443
Balliet, D., Li, N. P., Macfarlan, S. J., and Van Vugt, M. (2011a). Sex differences
in cooperation: a meta-analytic review of social dilemmas. Psychol. Bull. 137,
881–909. doi: 10.1037/a0025354
Balliet, D., Mulder, L. B., and Van Lange, P. A. (2011b). Reward, punishment
and cooperation: a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 137, 594–615. doi: 10.
1037/a0023489
Balliet, D., Parks, C., and Joireman, J. (2009). Social value orientation and
cooperation in social dilemmas: a meta-analysis. Group Process. Intergroup
Relat. 12, 533–547. doi: 10.1177/1368430209105040
Baltes, P. B., and Smith, J. (2008). The fascination of wisdom: its nature, ontogeny
and function. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 3, 56–64. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.
00062.x
Baltes, P. B., and Staudinger, U. M. (1993). The search for a psychology of wisdom.
Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 2, 75–80. doi: 10.1111/1467-8721.ep10770914
Baltes, P. B., and Staudinger, U. M. (2000). Wisdom: a metaheuristic (pragmatic)
to orchestrate mind and virtue toward excellence. Am. Psychol. 55, 122–136.
doi: 10.1037/0003-066x.55.1.122
Basseches, M. (1980). Dialectical schemata. Hum. Dev. 23, 400–421. doi: 10.
1159/000272600
Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 June 2015 | Volume 7 | Article 120
Lim and Yu Aging and wisdom
Beadle, J. N., Paradiso, S., Kovach, C., Polgreen, L., Denburg, N. L.,
and Tranel, D. (2012). Effects of age-related differences in empathy on
social economic decision-making. Int. Psychogeriatr. 24, 822–833. doi: 10.
1017/s1041610211002547
Beadle, J. N., Sheehan, A. H., Dahlben, B., and Gutchess, A. H. (2013). Aging,
empathy and prosociality. J. Gerontol. B Psychol. Sci. Soc. Sci. 702, 215–224.
doi: 10.1093/geronb/gbt091
Bellemare, C., and Kröger, S. (2007). On representative social capital. Eur. Econ.
Rev. 51, 183–202. doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2006.03.006
Bellemare, C., Kröger, S., and Van Soest, A. (2011). Preferences, intentions
and expectation violations: a large-scale experiment with a representative
subject pool. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 78, 349–365. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.
01.019
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and Mccabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity and social history.
Games Econ. Behav. 10, 122–142. doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1027
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., and Fink, G. (2010a). The greying of the global
population and its macroeconomic consequences. Twenty-First Century Soc.
J. Acad. Soc. Sci. 5, 233–242. doi: 10.1080/17450144.2010.480826
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., and Fink, G. (2010b). Implications of population
aging for economic growth. Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 26, 583–612. doi: 10.
1093/oxrep/grq038
Brassen, S., Gamer, M., Peters, J., Gluth, S., and Buchel, C. (2012). Don’t look back
in anger! Responsiveness to missed chances in successful and nonsuccessful
aging. Science 336, 612–614. doi: 10.1126/science.1217516
Brosig, J. (2002). Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results
in a prisoner’s dilemma game. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 47, 275–290. doi: 10.
1016/s0167-2681(01)00211-6
Button, K. S., Ioannidis, J. P., Mokrysz, C., Nosek, B. A., Flint, J., Robinson, E. S.,
et al. (2013). Power failure: why small sample size undermines the reliability of
neuroscience. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 14, 365–376. doi: 10.1038/nrn3475
Camerer, C. F., and Fehr, E. (2004). ‘‘Measuring social norms and preferences
using experimental games: a guide for social scientists,’’ in Foundations of
Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from
Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, eds J. Henrich R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. F.
Camerer, E. Fehr, and H. Gintis (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press),
55–95.
Camerer, C., and Weber, M. (1992). Recent developments in modeling
preferences: uncertainty and ambiguity. J. Risk Uncertain. 5, 325–370. doi: 10.
1007/bf00122575
Carstensen, L. L., Isaacowitz, D. M., and Charles, S. T. (1999). Taking time
seriously: a theory of socioemotional selectivity. Am. Psychol. 54, 165–181.
doi: 10.1037/0003-066x.54.3.165
Chao, L.-W., Szrek, H., Pereira, N. S., and Pauly,M. V. (2009). Time preference and
its relationship with age, health and survival probability. Judgm. Decis. Mak.
4, 1–19.
Charles, S. T. (2010). Strength and vulnerability integration: a model of
emotional well-being across adulthood. Psychol. Bull. 136, 1068–1091. doi: 10.
1037/a0021232
Charness, G., and Villeval, M.-C. (2009). Cooperation and competition in
intergenerational experiments in the field and the laboratory. Am. Econ. Rev.
99, 956–978. doi: 10.1257/aer.99.3.956
Chaudhuri, A. (2011). Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods
experiments: a selective survey of the literature. Exp. Econ. 14, 47–83. doi: 10.
1007/s10683-010-9257-1
Chowdhury, R., Guitart-Masip, M., Lambert, C., Dayan, P., Huys, Q., Düzel, E.,
et al. (2013). Dopamine restores reward prediction errors in old age. Nat.
Neurosci. 16, 648–653. doi: 10.1038/nn.3364
Christensen, K., Doblhammer, G., Rau, R., and Vaupel, J. W. (2009). Aging
populations: the challenges ahead. Lancet 374, 1196–1208. doi: 10.1016/S0140-
6736(09)61460-4
Cooper, R., Dejong, D. V., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T. W. (1996). Cooperation
without reputation: experimental evidence from prisoner’s dilemma games.
Games Econ. Behav. 12, 187–218. doi: 10.1006/game.1996.0013
Cooper, D. J., and Dutcher, E. G. (2011). The dynamics of responder behavior in
ultimatum games: a meta-study. Exp. Econ. 14, 519–546. doi: 10.1007/s10683-
011-9280-x
Coudin, G., and Alexopoulos, T. (2010). ‘Help me! I’m old!’ How negative aging
stereotypes create dependency among older adults. Aging Ment. Health 14,
516–523. doi: 10.1080/13607861003713182
Cuddy, A. J., Norton, M. I., and Fiske, S. T. (2005). This old stereotype: the
pervasiveness and persistence of the elderly stereotype. J. Soc. Issues 61,
267–285. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2005.00405.x
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 31, 169–193. doi: 10.
1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.001125
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: a meta study. Exp. Econ. 14, 583–610. doi: 10.
1007/s10683-011-9283-7
Epstein, L. G. (1999). A definition of uncertainty aversion. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66,
579–608. doi: 10.1111/1467-937x.00099
Etang, A., Fielding, D., and Knowles, S. (2011). Does trust extend beyond the
village? Experimental trust and social distance in Cameroon. Exp. Econ. 14,
15–35. doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9255-3
Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U. (2002). Why social preferences matter-The impact of
non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. Econ. J. 112,
C1–C33. doi: 10.1111/1468-0297.00027
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., Von Rosenbladt, B., Schupp, J., and Wagner, G. G.
(2003). A nation-wide laboratory: examining trust and trustworthiness by
integrating behavioral experiments into representative surveys. Schmollers
Jahrbuch: Z. Wirtschafts- und Soz./J. Appl. Soc. Sci. Stud. 122, 519–542.
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and
cooperation. Q. J. Econ. 114, 817–868. doi: 10.1162/003355399556151
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. M. (2001). ‘‘Theories of fairness and
reciprocity—Evidence and economic applications,’’ in CESifo Working
Paper, 1–56.
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., and Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple
bargaining experiments. Games Econ. Behav. 6, 347–369. doi: 10.1006/game.
1994.1021
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., and O’donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting
and time preference: a critical review. J. Econ. Lit. 40, 351–401. doi: 10.
1257/002205102320161311
Green, L., Fry, A. F., and Myerson, J. (1994). Discounting of delayed rewards:
a life-span comparison. Psychol. Sci. 5, 33–36. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1994.
tb00610.x
Green, L., Myerson, J., Lichtman, D., Rosen, S., and Fry, A. (1996). Temporal
discounting in choice between delayed rewards: the role of age and income.
Psychol. Aging 11, 79–84. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.11.1.79
Grossmann, I., and Kross, E. (2014). Exploring solomon’s paradox: self-
distancing eliminates the self-other asymmetry in wise reasoning about close
relationships in younger and older adults. Psychol. Sci. 25, 1571–1580. doi: 10.
1177/0956797614535400
Grossmann, I., Karasawa, M., Izumi, S., Na, J., Varnum, M. E., Kitayama, S., et al.
(2012). Aging and wisdom: culture matters. Psychol. Sci. 23, 1059–1066. doi: 10.
1177/0956797612446025
Grossmann, I., Na, J., Varnum, M. E., Park, D. C., Kitayama, S., and Nisbett, R. E.
(2010). Reasoning about social conflicts improves into old age. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U S A 107, 7246–7250. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1001715107
Gusnard, D. A., Akbudak, E., Shulman, G. L., and Raichle, M. E. (2001). Medial
prefrontal cortex and self-referential mental activity: relation to a default mode
of brain function. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 98, 4259–4264. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
071043098
Gutchess, A. H., Kensinger, E. A., and Schacter, D. L. (2010). Functional
neuroimaging of self-referential encoding with age. Neuropsychologia 48,
211–219. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.006
Güth, W. (1995). On ultimatum bargaining experiments—A personal review. J.
Econ. Behav. Organ. 27, 329–344. doi: 10.1016/0167-2681(94)00071-l
Güth, W., and Kocher, M. G. (2014). More than thirty years of ultimatum
bargaining experiments: motives, variations and a survey of the recent
literature. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 108, 396–409. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., and Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis
of ultimatum bargaining. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 3, 367–388. doi: 10.1016/0167-
2681(82)90011-7
Güth, W., and Tietz, R. (1990). Ultimatum bargaining behavior: a survey and
comparison of experimental results. J. Econ. Psychol. 11, 417–449. doi: 10.
1016/0167-4870(90)90021-Z
Halfmann, K., Hedgcock, W., and Denburg, N. L. (2013). Age-related differences
in discounting future gains and losses. J. Neurosci. Psychol. Econ. 6, 42–54.
doi: 10.1037/npe0000003
Hamami, A., Serbun, S. J., and Gutchess, A. H. (2011). Self-referencing enhances
memory specificity with age. Psychol. Aging 26, 636–646. doi: 10.1037/a0022626
Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 June 2015 | Volume 7 | Article 120
Lim and Yu Aging and wisdom
Harlé, K. M., and Sanfey, A. G. (2012). Social economic decision-making across
the lifespan: an fMRI investigation. Neuropsychologia 50, 1416–1424. doi: 10.
1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.02.026
Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., and Williams, M. B. (2002). Estimating individual
discount rates in Denmark: a field experiment. Am. Econ. Rev. 92, 1606–1617.
doi: 10.1257/000282802762024674
Hau, R., Pleskac, T. J., Kiefer, J., and Hertwig, R. (2008). The description-
experience gap in risky choice: the role of sample size and experienced
probabilities. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 21, 493–518. doi: 10.1002/bdm.598
Heckhausen, J., Wrosch, C., and Schulz, R. (2010). A motivational theory of life-
span development. Psychol. Rev. 117, 32–60. doi: 10.1037/a0017668
Hedden, T., and Gabrieli, J. D. (2004). Insights into the aging mind: a view from
cognitive neuroscience. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 5, 87–96. doi: 10.1038/nrn1323
Heidrich, S. M., and Denney, N. W. (1994). Does social problem solving differ
from other types of problem solving during the adult years? Exp. Aging Res. 20,
105–126. doi: 10.1080/03610739408253957
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., and Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the
world? Behav. Brain Sci. 33, 61–83. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X0999152X
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E. U., and Erev, I. (2004). Decisions from
experience and the effect of rare events in risky choice. Psychol. Sci. 15, 534–539.
doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x
Hertwig, R., and Erev, I. (2009). The description-experience gap in risky choice.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 517–523. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.09.004
Holm, H., and Nystedt, P. (2005). Intra-generational trust—A semi-experimental
study of trust among different generations. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 58, 403–419.
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.10.013
Jeste, D. V., and Harris, J. C. (2010). Wisdom—A neuroscience perspective. J. Am.
Med. Assoc. 304, 1602–1603. doi: 10.1001/jama.2010.1458
Johansson-Stenman, O., Mahmud, M., and Martinsson, P. (2013). Trust, trust
games and stated trust: evidence from rural Bangladesh. J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
95, 286–298. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.022
Johnson, N. D., and Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: a meta-analysis. J. Econ.
Psychol. 32, 865–889. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007
Jones, G. (2008). Are smarter groups more cooperative? Evidence from prisoner’s
dilemma experiments, 1959–2003. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 68, 489–497. doi: 10.
1016/j.jebo.2008.06.010
Juvin, H. (2010). The Coming of the Body. London, UK: Verso.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness as a constraint on
profit seeking: entitlements in the market. Am. Econ. Rev. 76, 728–741.
Keren, G., and Gerritsen, L. E. (1999). On the robustness and possible accounts
of ambiguity aversion. Acta Psychol. 103, 149–172. doi: 10.1016/s0001-
6918(99)00034-7
Kirby, K. N., Petry, N. M., and Bickel, W. K. (1999). Heroin addicts have higher
discount rates for delayed rewards than non-drug-using controls. J. Exp.
Psychol. Gen. 128, 78–87. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.128.1.78
Kite, M. E., and Johnson, B. T. (1988). Attitudes toward older and younger adults:
a meta-analysis. Psychol. Aging 3, 233–244. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.3.3.233
Kite, M. E., Stockdale, G. D., Whitley, B. E., and Johnson, B. T. (2005). Attitudes
toward younger and older adults: an updatedmeta-analytic review. J. Soc. Issues
61, 241–266. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2005.00404.x
Kovalchik, S., Camerer, C. F., Grether, D.M., Plott, C. R., and Allman, J. M. (2005).
Aging and decision making: a comparison between neurologically healthy
elderly and young individuals. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 58, 79–94. doi: 10.1016/j.
jebo.2003.12.001
Kramer, D. A. (1990). ‘‘Conceptualizing wisdom: the primacy of affect—cognition
relations,’’ inWisdom: Its Nature, Origins and Development, ed. R. J. Sternberg
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 279–313.
Ledyard, J. O. (1995). ‘‘Public goods: a survey of experimental research,’’ in
The Handbook of Experimental Economics, eds J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 111–194.
Levitt, S. D., and List, J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring
social preferences reveal about the real world? J. Econ. Perspect. 21, 153–174.
doi: 10.1257/jep.21.2.153
Levy, B. R. (2001). Eradication of ageism requires addressing the enemy within.
Gerontologist 41, 578–579. doi: 10.1093/geront/41.5.578
Li, Y., Baldassi, M., Johnson, E. J., and Weber, E. U. (2013). Complementary
cognitive capabilities, economic decision making and aging. Psychol. Aging 28,
595–613. doi: 10.1037/a0034172
Lloyd-Sherlock, P. (2000). Population aging in developed and developing regions:
implications for health policy. Soc. Sci. Med. 51, 887–895. doi: 10.1016/s0277-
9536(00)00068-x
Löckenhoff, C. E., O’donoghue, T., and Dunning, D. (2011). Age differences in
temporal discounting: the role of dispositional affect and anticipated emotions.
Psychol. Aging 26, 274–284. doi: 10.1037/a0023280
Lopes, L. L. (1983). Some thoughts on the psychological concept of risk. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 9, 137–144. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.9.1.137
Lutz, W., Sanderson, W., and Scherbov, S. (2008). The coming acceleration
of global population aging. Nature 451, 716–719. doi: 10.1038/
nature06516
Martinelli, P., Sperduti, M., and Piolino, P. (2013). Neural substrates of the self-
memory system: new insights from a meta-analysis. Hum. Brain Mapp. 34,
1515–1529. doi: 10.1002/hbm.22008
Mata, R., Josef, A. K., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., and Hertwig, R. (2011). Age
differences in risky choice: a meta-analysis. Ann. N Y Acad. Sci. 1235, 18–29.
doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06200.x
Mather, M., and Carstensen, L. L. (2005). Aging and motivated cognition: the
positivity effect in attention and memory. Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 496–502. doi: 10.
1016/j.tics.2005.08.005
Mathers, C. D., Sadana, R., Salomon, J. A., Murray, C. J., and Lopez, A. D. (2001).
Healthy life expectancy in 191 countries, 1999. Lancet 357, 1685–1691. doi: 10.
1016/s0140-6736(00)04824-8
Mayr, U., Wozniak, D., Davidson, C., Kuhns, D., and Harbaugh, W. T. (2012).
Competitiveness across the life span: the feisty fifties. Psychol. Aging 27,
278–285. doi: 10.1037/a0025655
Meeks, T. W., and Jeste, D. V. (2009). Neurobiology of wisdom: a literature
overview. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 66, 355–365. doi: 10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.
2009.8
Meier, S. (2006). ‘‘A survey of economic theories and field evidence on pro-social
behavior,’’ in Working paper series, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1–41.
Mickler, C., and Staudinger, U. M. (2008). Personal wisdom: validation and age-
related differences of a performance measure. Psychol. Aging 23, 787–799.
doi: 10.1037/a0013928
Morgenstern, O., and Von Neumann, J. (1947). Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Ann. Math. 54, 286–295. doi: 10.
2307/1969529
Ng, T. W., and Feldman, D. C. (2008). The relationship of age to ten dimensions
of job performance. J. Appl. Psychol. 93, 392–423. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.
93.2.392
North, M. S., and Fiske, S. T. (2012). An inconvenienced youth? Ageism and
its potential intergenerational roots. Psychol. Bull. 138, 982–997. doi: 10.
1037/a0027843
Oeppen, J., and Vaupel, J. W. (2002). Demography. Broken limits to life
expectancy. Science 296, 1029–1031. doi: 10.1126/science.1069675
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., and Van De Kuilen, G. (2004). Cultural differences in
ultimatum game experiments: evidence from a meta-analysis. Exp. Econ. 7,
171–188. doi: 10.1023/b:exec.0000026978.14316.74
Park, D. C., and Reuter-Lorenz, P. (2009). The adaptive brain: aging and
neurocognitive scaffolding. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 60, 173–196. doi: 10.
1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093656
Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., and Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial
behavior: multilevel perspectives. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 56, 365–392. doi: 10.
1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070141
Perlman, D., and Peplau, L. A. (1981). ‘‘Toward a social psychology of loneliness,’’
in Personal Relationships in Disorder, eds S. Duck and R. Gilmour (London,
UK: Academic Press), 31–56.
Poterba, J. (2004). ‘‘The impact of population aging on financial markets,’’ in
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 1–49.
Rabin, M., and Thaler, R. H. (2001). Anomalies: risk aversion. J. Econ. Perspect. 15,
219–232. doi: 10.1257/jep.15.1.219
Raichle, M. E., Macleod, A. M., Snyder, A. Z., Powers, W. J., Gusnard, D. A., and
Shulman, G. L. (2001). A default mode of brain function. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U S A 98, 676–682. doi: 10.1073/pnas.98.2.676
Rakow, T., and Newell, B. R. (2010). Degrees of uncertainty: an overview and
framework for future research on experience-based choice. J. Behav. Decis.
Mak. 23, 1–14. doi: 10.1002/bdm.681
Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 June 2015 | Volume 7 | Article 120
Lim and Yu Aging and wisdom
Raz, N., and Rodrigue, K. M. (2006). Differential aging of the brain: patterns,
cognitive correlates and modifiers. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 30, 730–748.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2006.07.001
Read, D. (2001). Is time-discounting hyperbolic or subadditive? J. Risk Uncertain.
23, 5–32. doi: 10.1023/A:1011198414683
Read, D., Frederick, S., and Scholten, M. (2013). DRIFT: an analysis of outcome
framing in intertemporal choice. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 39,
573–588. doi: 10.1037/a0029177
Read, D., and Read, N. L. (2004). Time discounting over the lifespan.Organ. Behav.
Hum. Decis. Process. 94, 22–32. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.01.002
Read, D., and Roelofsma, P. H. (2003). Subadditive versus hyperbolic discounting:
a comparison of choice and matching. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 91,
140–153. doi: 10.1016/s0749-5978(03)00060-8
Reed, A. E., Chan, L., and Mikels, J. A. (2014). Meta-analysis of the age-related
positivity effect: age differences in preferences for positive over negative
information. Psychol. Aging 29, 1–15. doi: 10.1037/a0035194
Reimers, S., Maylor, E. A., Stewart, N., and Chater, N. (2009). Associations
between a one-shot delay discounting measure and age, income, education and
real-world impulsive behavior. Pers. Individ. Dif. 47, 973–978. doi: 10.1016/j.
paid.2009.07.026
Rhodes, S. R. (1983). Age-related differences in work attitudes and behavior: a
review and conceptual analysis. Psychol. Bull. 93, 328–367. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.93.2.328
Rieger, M., and Mata, R. (2015). On the generality of age differences in social and
nonsocial decision making. J. Gerontol. B Psychol. Sci. Soc. Sci. 70, 200–212.
doi: 10.1093/geronb/gbt088
Roalf, D. R., Mitchell, S. H., Harbaugh, W. T., and Janowsky, J. S. (2012). Risk,
reward and economic decision making in aging. J. Gerontol. B Psychol. Sci. Soc.
Sci. 67, 289–298. doi: 10.1093/geronb/gbr099
Rogers, T. B., Kuiper, N. A., and Kirker, W. S. (1977). Self-reference and the
encoding of personal information. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 35, 677–688. doi: 10.
1037/0022-3514.35.9.677
Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas a meta-
analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Ration. Soc. 7, 58–92. doi: 10.
1177/1043463195007001004
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Gibbs, S. E., Khanna, K., Nielsen, L., Carstensen, L. L., and
Knutson, B. (2007). Anticipation of monetary gain but not loss in healthy older
adults. Nat. Neurosci. 10, 787–791. doi: 10.1038/nn1894
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Mata, R., Radu, P. T., Ballard, I. C., Carstensen, L. L.,
and McClure, S. M. (2011). Age differences in striatal delay sensitivity
during intertemporal choice in healthy adults. Front. Neurosci. 5:126. doi: 10.
3389/fnins.2011.00126
Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. New York, NY: Wiley.
Schneider, E. L., and Guralnik, J. M. (1990). The aging of America: impact on
health care costs. JAMA 263, 2335–2340. doi: 10.1001/jama.263.17.2335
Sierra, F., Hadley, E., Suzman, R., and Hodes, R. (2009). Prospects for life span
extension. Annu. Rev. Med. 60, 457–469. doi: 10.1146/annurev.med.60.061607.
220533
Sproten, A., Diener, C., Fiebach, C., and Schwieren, C. (2010). ‘‘Aging and decision
making: how aging affects decisions under uncertainty,’’ in University of
Heidelberg Discussion Paper, 1–22.
Sproten, A., and Schwieren, C. (2015). ‘‘Age differences in the reaction to
incentives—do older people avoid competition?,’’ in University of Heidelberg
Discussion Paper, 1–14. doi: 10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.02.002
Sutter, M., and Kocher, M. G. (2007). Trust and trustworthiness across
different age groups. Games Econ. Behav. 59, 364–382. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.
07.006
Symons, C. S., and Johnson, B. T. (1997). The self-reference effect in memory: a
meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 121, 371–394. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.121.3.371
Taylor, P. E., and Walker, A. (1994). The aging workforce: employers’
attitudes towards older people. Work Employ. Soc. 8, 569–591. doi: 10.
1177/095001709484005
Taylor, P., and Walker, A. (1998). Employers and older workers:
attitudes and employment practices. Ageing Soc. 18, 641–658. doi: 10.
1017/s0144686x98007119
Thaler, R. H. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Econ.
Lett. 8, 201–207. doi: 10.1016/0165-1765(81)90067-7
Thaler, R. H. (1988). Anomalies: the ultimatum game. J. Econ. Perspect. 2, 195–206.
doi: 10.1257/jep.2.4.195
Thornton, W. J., and Dumke, H. A. (2005). Age differences in everyday problem-
solving and decision-making effectiveness: a meta-analytic review. Psychol.
Aging 20, 85–99. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.20.1.85
Tinker, A. (2002). The social implications of an aging population. Mech. Aging
Dev. 123, 729–735. doi: 10.1016/S0047-6374(01)00418-3
Tversky, A., and Fox, C. R. (1995). Weighing risk and uncertainty. Psychol. Rev.
102, 269–283. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.102.2.269
Vaupel, J. W. (2010). Biodemography of human aging. Nature 464, 536–542.
doi: 10.1038/nature08984
Vaupel, J.W., and Gowan, A. E. (1986). Passage toMethuselah: some demographic
consequences of continued progress against mortality. Am. J. Public Health 76,
430–433. doi: 10.2105/ajph.76.4.430
Vaupel, J. W., and Loichinger, E. (2006). Redistributing work in aging Europe.
Science 312, 1911–1913. doi: 10.1126/science.1127487
Weber, E. U., Shafir, S., and Blais, A.-R. (2004). Predicting risk sensitivity in
humans and lower animals: risk as variance or coefficient of variation. Psychol.
Rev. 111, 430–445. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.111.2.430
Whelan, R., and Mchugh, L. A. (2010). Temporal discounting of hypothetical
monetary rewards by adolescents, adults and older adults. Psychol. Record 59,
247–258.
Zelmer, J. (2003). Linear public goods experiments: a meta-analysis. Exp. Econ. 6,
299–310. doi: 10.1023/A:1026277420119
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Lim and Yu. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution
and reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or
licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction
is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 June 2015 | Volume 7 | Article 120
